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DEEPWATER PORT ACT OF 1974: SOME INTERNATIONAL
AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPLICATIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
On January 4, 1975,' President Ford's signature transformed HR 10701
into Public Law 93-627, the Deepwater Port Act of 1974,1 "an act to regu-
late commerce, promote efficiency in transportation and protect the envi-
ronment, by establishing procedures for the location, construction, and
operation of deepwater ports off the coasts of the United States, and for
other purposes,' ' a (hereinafter referred to as the Act). Legislative consider-
ations specifically involved the legality under international law of author-
izing construction of artificial structures on the high seas under domestic
jurisdiction, with use of these facilities conditioned upon acceptance of
such action and the inherent environmental consequences of encouraging
the plying of American waters by supertankers. This Note presents an
examination of those issues within the framework of the Deepwater Port
Act itself.
II. BACKGROUND
The United States consumes over 18 million barrels of oil per day with
only 60 percent of that consumptive appetite met by domestic production.
Imported petroleum must satisfy the balance of domestic demands.
Projections indicate that national dependence on crude oil imports will
increase dramatically within coming years, perhaps rising to the level of
26 million barrels per day by 1985.' In 1973, 80 percent of those imports
arrived via tankers5 and there are no indications that technology will soon
replace tankers with more efficient means of moving vast quantities of
petroleum on a global scale. Given such facts, one may be justified in
assuming that oil tankers will very likely play an integral role in petroleum
transportation in coming years.
The average size of tankers now used to bring crude oil to the United
States is 30,000 to 35,000 deadweight tons (dwt).' Vessels of this size
N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1975, at 21, col. 1.
2 33 U.S.C. §§ 1501-24 (Supp. IV, 1974).
S. REP. No. 93-1217, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. AND AD.
NEWS 7529 [hereinafter cited as [1974] U.S. CODE NEws.
' Hearings on H.R. 7,501 Before the Subcomm. on the Environment of the House Comm.
On Interior and Insular Affairs, 93d Cong. 1st Sess., ser. 22, at 119 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as Env. 1.
[19741 U.S. CODE NEWS, supra note 3, at 7533.
Hearings on H.R. 5091 and H.R. 5898 Before the Comm. on Merchant Marine and
Fisheries, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 15, at 13 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Merchant Marine
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experience little difficulty in service to United States ports. But as the
volume of crude oil shipments has steadily increased at the global level,
so too have demands for a more economical transport system. Such pres-
sures have resulted in the conclusion that the most efficient method of
moving large quantities of crude oil vast distances involves larger tanker
capacity. This is amply illustrated by the fact that the cost of Persian Gulf
oil transported in 47,000 dwt tankers to Louisiana is $7.30 per ton more
than oil shipped in a 125,000 dwt tanker.' As a result of such economic
considerations (and spurred partly by the abrupt closing of the Suez Canal
during the 1967 Middle East Six Day War and the resulting necessity of
routing tanker fleets around Cape Horn), the oil industry looked to the
development of a class of tankers much larger than those previously in
service as a means of reducing costs. These supertankers or Very Large
Crude Carriers (VLCC), ranging in size from 100,000 to 500,000 dwt, may
exceed 1000 feet in length and require drafts of 90 feet or more. Already
plans are underway to construct VLCC in the range of 700,000 dwt, and
tankers of up to 1 million dwt are not unforeseeable.
Large capacity vessels of 100,000 dwt or more presently comprise only
ten percent of the 4,336 tankers operating around the world; however, that
ten percent represents almost 40 percent of total tanker capacity.' The "fly
in the ointment" from the petroleum industry's perspective lies in the fact
that VLCC require harbors with deep draft channels. With the exception
of the Puget Sound area on the Pacific Ocean and several inlets on the
coast of Maine, no United States port currently has the draft required to
accommodate VLCC;10 consequently, the concept of deepwater ports has
emerged as an enticing answer to the problem of providing supertankers
with access to American refinery capacity.
Basically, the concept of deepwater ports consists of a system whereby
VLCC are able to discharge their cargos of crude oil while still at sea by
means of a pipeline hookup to the shore. Taking advantage of ocean depths
in excess of 100 feet, supertankers will dock at a floating buoy or artificial
island and make connections with floating hoses. With the aid of a pump-
ing station located at or near the deepwater port installation, the VLCC is
able to discharge its entire cargo of crude oil without the necessity of a close
and Fisheries Hearings]. The relationship between deadweight tons (dwt) and tanker capac-
ity is roughly 7.5 barrels per dwt, id. at 60.
Env., supra note 4, at 30.
Hearings to Guarantee Affected States an Equal Voice in the Construction of Deepwater
Ports Before the Subcomm. on Energy of the Comm. on Public Works, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
ser. 15, at 23, 67 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Equal Voice Hearings].
[19741 U.S. CODE NEWS, supra note 3, at 7533.
ID Joint Hearings on S. 1751 and S. 2232 Before the Special Joint Subcomm. On Deepwater
Ports Legislation of the Comm. on Commerce, Interior and InsularAffairs, and Public Works,
93d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 59, pt. 1, at 127, 409 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Joint Hearings];
[19741 U.S. CODE NEWS, supra note 3, at 7534; Meltz, The Deepwater Port Act of 1974: Half
Speed Ahead, 5 ENV. L. REP. 50043, 50046-47 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Meltz].
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approach to shore." The discharged oil is then either stored at the site of
the deepwater port in large storage tanks or immediately piped to shore
where it may be processed at either on-site or distant refineries.
Proponents of deepwater ports seek to base their position on two primary
factors: economics and environmental concerns. Both theories are based on
the assumption that national energy needs can only be met in the future
by increasing or, at the very least, maintaining levels of oil shipped to this
country. Given that starting point, they maintain that the United States
must reconcile its voracious, steadily increasing demand for petroleum
products with the most efficient means technologically available for satis-
fying that demand." Longhaul economics have already demonstrated that
increased world-wide use of supertankers is the best method of reducing
per-barrel shipping costs.'3 Thus, the United States must either fall in line
with current trends or accept the higher cost consequentially inherent in
the use of smaller tankers. But, they argue, the latter course would in the
long run result in environmental deterioration. The use of supertankers
would reduce harbor congestion by cutting down on the number of tankers
in service, resulting in lessened chances of oil pollution caused both by
tanker collisions and by unintentional (as well as intentional) discharges
of oil from ships.' 4 Further, any oil spills resulting from supertanker acci-
dents would occur at sea, thus reducing the chances of serious damage to
beaches and marsh areas. The Council on Environmental Quality has
estimated that use of VLCC and deepwater ports can reduce the risk of
spills by 90 percent from levels anticipated if the small tankers currently
in use are required to move large volumes of crude oil into small ports.'5
In true environmental impact statement fashion, proponents also point out
that the alternatives to deepwater port development are environmentally
and/or economically less desirable. These alternatives include transship-
ment of oil by pipelines from deepwater ports located in Canada, Puerto
Rico or Mexico; federal subsidization of a shallow-draft tanker fleet; dredg-
ing present harbors to depths enabling them to receive VLCC; or continu-
ing present practices.'6 The argument is completed by noting that implica-
tions of these alternatives would involve alternative impacts on the coastal
environment of equal or greater proportion," substantial outlays of govern-
" For detailed operating procedures of one proposed deepwater port (Louisiana Offshore
Oil Port) see Louisiana Offshore Port Feasibility Study in Merchant Marine and Fisheries
Hearings, supra note 6, at 301.
" Meltz, supra note 10, at 50043.
, See text accompanying note 7 supra.
" Merchant Marine and Fisheries Hearings, supra note 6, at 152-53.
" Senate Passes, Sends to Conference Bill with Stiff Environmental Control, 5 ENV.
REP.-CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 940 (1974-75).
'" Id. at 143.
7 I.e., the dredging activity required to deepen present channels of 50 foot depth to the
100 feet or more of depth necessary to accommodate VLCC will have far-ranging effects on
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ment capital, balance of payments problems, and questions regarding the
security of an adequate fuel supply to the United States. 8
The opposition to deepwater port development points out that the dis-
charge from only one such supertanker is liable to result in damage equiva-
lent to that likely to be produced by many average sized tankers. They also
point to the fact that such accidents are even more likely to occur on a per
ship basis if supertankers are pushed into widespread service because such
tankers are constructed with few environmental or safety considerations in
mind." Environmentalists point out such faults as single screw construc-
tion, lack of stabilization planes, lack of double hulls, and general
economic-minded construction as factors which support this conclusion.
The enormous distances required to stop VLCC-as much as 2.5 miles for
a relatively small tanker in the 200,000 dwt range-drastically reduce the
tolerable margin of error. In fact, it is impossible for giant tankers to
operate within the rules set out in Regulations for Preventing Collisions at
Sea.2 0 Once it is realized that oil spill containment is still in its infancy,
the incredible seriousness of the problems presented by modern trends in
oil transshipment becomes apparent. Economics and the energy crisis,
however, gained the upper hand in committee hearings. It should not be
surprising that the legislative history of the Deepwater Port Act is con-
cerned much less with questions addressed to whether or not such develop-
ment is desirable than with how and where such development will occur.
Iml. AN ANALYSIS OF THE DEEPWATER PORT ACT
The basic thrust of the Deepwater Port Act as seems to translate itself
into dual commandments: (1) construction and operation of deepwater
port facilities will be strictly planned according to Congressional priorities;
and (2) once a permit is issued, the licensee will be subject to continuing
scrutiny in order to provide for on-going compliance with these priorities.
Such a system can only be geared to function in connection with provisions
that allow ample time, means, and expertise for the formulation of detailed
plans and also for the means whereby both interested governmental enti-
ties and private citizens may monitor these activities and exercise appro-
priate enforcement measures. The Act attempts to provide this through a
permit system with primary responsibility for its administration vested in
one existing federal agency rather than a specially created commission.
Sufficient input sources are provided in favor of both other interested
coastal ecosystems, Merchant Marine and Fisheries Hearings, supra note 6, at 208-09; Joint
Hearings, supra note 10, at 567-68.
" Hearing Pursuant to S. Res. 45 Before the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs,
92d Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 26, at 63, 66, 152-56 (1972).
" Joint Hearings, supra note 10, at 569-70.
Kalsi, Oil in Neptune's Kingdom: Problems and Responses to Contain Environmental
Degradation of the Oceans by Oil Pollution, 3 ENV. AFFAIRS 79, 93 (1974) [hereinafter cited
as Kalsil.
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government agencies, federal and local, and the public, to insure that
administration of the Act by one agency will not take place in a vacuum.
Primary authority under the Act is given to the Secretary of Transporta-
tion (hereinafter referred to as the Secretary). To the Secretary falls the
responsibility of formulating appropriate guidelines to carry out the pur-
poses and provisions of the Act." The Secretary also acts as the clearing
house for permit applications, to coordinate the input supplied by other
interested agencies concerning applications, to conduct hearings, and ei-
ther to approve or disapprove each application." A permit application filed
with the Secretary constitutes an application for all federal authorizations
needed, as the Secretary is charged with the forwarding of applications to
all federal agencies and departments exercising jurisdiction over any phase
of construction, operation, or ownership of deepwater ports., The Secre-
tary also acts for these agencies in preparing a single environmental impact
statement which preempts their responsibility in this area." After con-
struction of the facility has reached completion and after consultation with
various other divisions of the federal government, the Secretary will
designate the limits of a safety zone around the installation and list those
activities permitted within that zone. The continued operation of the port
is subject to the authority of the Secretary to receive requested information
necessary to carry out the provisions of the Act, as well as the power to
examine the records and books of the enterprise. On-the-spot investiga-
tion is provided for through a provision for reasonable access by United
States officials at all times. Once it is determined that a violation of some
provision of the Act has occurred or of any regulation, order, or license
condition, the Secretary may either issue a compliance order or request the
Attorney General to file a civil suit against the miscreant.Y In addition,
functions of the Secretary include promulgation of standards necessary to
assure the safe construction and operation of oil pipelines on the outer
continental shelf 8 and the authority to halt all activity concerned with the
structure should an emergency situation arise." It is also the Secretary's
responsibility to submit an annual report to the Congress concerning deep-
water port activities, supervisory and regulatory activities, enforcement
proceedings, and recommendations as to further legislative authority de-
sired in order to better effectuate the purpose of the Act.3
2 33 U.S.C. §§ 1504(a), 1505 (Supp. IV, 1974).
22 Id. § 1504(e)(1), (g).
2 Id. § 1504(e)(2).
21 Id. § 1504(f).
21 Id. §§ 1509(a), (d)(1); § 1509(d)(2) allows the Secretary to establish a safety zone around
the facility during construction.
26 Id. § 1512.
21 Id. § 1511(a).
2' Id. § 1520(a).
11 Id. § 1511(b).
3'1 Id. § 1519.
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One of the Secretary's most important functions under the Act is over-
sight of permit procedures. The permit process underscores the basic
method by which the Act seeks to put decisive control of all port activity
in the hands of the federal government. The scheme is simple enough. If
someone wishes to build a superport, they must first obtain a permit from
the federal government; the permit will not be forthcoming until certain
procedural as well as substantive requirements are met.3" Once the permit
is granted it is subject to revocation or suspension for failure to fully com-
ply with the statutory and regulatory scheme."2 As the cost of constructing
a deepwater port has been estimated as high as $575 million,3 it would
seem that few licensees would care to jeopardize an investment of such
magnitude by intentionally obstreperous conduct. This rationale is tem-
pered somewhat by the fact that any such action on the Secretary's part
would be subject to judicial review." However, the threat of governmental
action exists.
Any citizen of the United States meeting the eligibility requirements put
forth by the Act is a potential licensee. 5 This includes individuals,
partnerships, corporations and governmental entities. Several corporations
may join in one cooperative effort, the resulting association being eligible
for the issuance of a license. This is in large part a recognition of the
enormous financial reserves which will be needed to fund construction and
operation of a deepwater port. Section 1506 of the Act specifically deals
with antitrust review pursuant to this contingency and attempts to insure
that such undertakings will be consistent with the antitrust laws and will
not result in the licensee enjoying a privileged status. Not only must the
licensee conform to antitrust laws; the terms of the Act specifically respect
the rights of the Attorney General and the Federal Trade Commission to
challenge any anticompetitive aspect of deepwater port operation." The
effect of this section would seem to be directed toward the removal of any
prima facie presumptions of antitrust violations arising merely from the
fact that two or more corporations choose to direct their energies toward a
joint effort in this field.
As noted above, an application filed with the Secretary statutorily con-
stitutes an application for all needed federal authorizations pertaining to
ownership, construction, and operation of a deepwater port. The permit
procedure becomes operative as soon as the first application for a deepwa-
ter port license is made. The Act does not attempt to dictate the location
of any port established pursuant to it. That decision is purely one of policy
' d. § 1504(c)(1), 2 (A)-(L).
32 Id. § 1511.
Cost of Seadock Project (off Freeport, Texas), Equal Voice Hearings, supra note 8, at
11.
: 33 U.S.C. § 1516 (Supp. IV, 1974).
Id. § 1503(g).
31 Id. § 1506(b)(2).
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and practicality to be decided upon by the applicant. The applicant must
submit detailed plans of the project in the application to the Secretary."
The Secretary, upon receipt of the application," has 21 days in which to
determine the completeness of the information detailed in the application.
If all items are in order, notice of the application and a summary of the
plans will then be published in the Federal Register.9 Preconstruction
testing and site evaluation by the applicants is allowed sans permit; how-
ever, those activities which adversely affect the environment, interfere
with authorized uses of the outer continental shelf or pose a threat to
human health and welfare are subject to regulations prescribed by the
Secretary. 0
An approved license application triggers the exclusivity policy of the
Act. Along with the proposed application, the Secretary is required to
publish in the Federal Register a description of the application area en-
compassing the proposed site.4 Within that zone no other deepwater port
will be constructed. The application area consists of any reasonable area
within which a deepwater port shall be constructed and operated and shall
not exceed a circular zone with center located at the proposed port site and
radius extending to the high water mark of the nearest adjacent state.4,
The publication of such information in the Federal Register shall be ac-
companied by a call for all other applications within the designated area.
Persons intending to file an application for a site falling within the desig-
nated area must file a notice of intent within 60 days after publication in
the Federal Register and must submit the completed application within
90 days of said publication. Failure to meet these time limits will foreclose
consideration of the application until the application pending with respect
to the designated area has been denied.43
:17 Id. § 1504(c)(1).
31 The application must contain, but is not limited to, such information as: the identity
and addresses of all persons having an ownership interest of more than three percent, to the
extent feasible the identity and addresses of any person with whom the applicant has made
or proposes to make a significant contract for construction or operation of the deepwater port
including a copy of any such contract, identities and associations of affiliates, the proposed
location and capacity of the deepwater port, the envisioned design of the deepwater port, a
timetable of anticipated dates of completion according to each phase of the port's construc-
tion, the location and capacity of pipelines and storage facilities through or from which oil
transported through the deepwater port will flow, information as to refinery activity con-
nected with the facility, the financial and technical capabilities of the applicant, any such
information required by the Secretary in order to determine the environmental impact of the
deepwater port, descriptions of procedures to be used in connection with constructing, main-
taining, and operating the deepwater port and other qualifications possessed by the applicant
which support his application to hold a license. Id. § 1504(c)(2)(A-L).
: Id. § 1504(c)(1).
'" Id. § 1504(b).
9 Id. § 1504(d)(1).
12 Id. § 1504(d)(2).
,1 Id. § 1504(d)(3).
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Interested federal agencies and departments shall be forwarded copies
of all applications and based upon legal considerations within their area
of responsibility, shall recommend approval or disapproval of the license
to the Secretary not later than 45 days after the last public hearing on such
proposed license." No license approvals shall be forthcoming until at least
one public hearing has been held in each adjacent coastal state. Should
the Secretary determine that there exists one or more specific and material
factual issues, a formal evidentiary hearing (adjudicatory in character)
shall be held in the District of Columbia. The Act calls for the consolida-
tion whenever possible of hearings held pursuant to it with those held by
other agencies-again, the streamlined touch. Within 240 days of the ini-
tial application in an application area, the hearing process on applications
shall be closed out. 5 Note that hearings are to be held concerning individ-
ual applications and not on all the applications encompassed within a
single application area collectively. Within 90 days of the last public hear-
ing on a proposed license for an area, the Secretary is directed to approve
or deny any application for the designated area. 6 The total time elapsed
from the start of the application procedure is thus statutorily defined as
356 days, or just under one year.
The Secretary is not given absolute discretion in determining among
competing applicants which will receive the authorization to proceed
within each application area. Among the declared purposes of the Act is
included, "to . . .protect the interests of the United States and those of
adjacent coastal States in the location, construction, and operation of
deepwater ports. . . . "7 Section 1503(c)(3) provides that no license will be
forthcoming unless "the construction and operation of the deepwater
port will be in the national interest and consistent with national security
and other national policy goals and objectives. . . ." It may be true, as
has been noted by at least one commentator,"8 that the phrase "in the
national interest" can have little meaning in a nation with no coordinated
port policy; however, once the Secretary has determined that any given
applicant would "clearly best serve the national interest," issuance of a
license to that applicant is sanctioned. Thus, it would seem to appear that
the Secretary's first responsibility would be to determine whether any
proposed port would best serve the national interest. Although the settled
meaning of the phrase may yet be developed by judicial determinations,
section 1504(i)(3) gives the Secretary three factors to consider in making
his decision. In determining whether any one proposed deepwater port
clearly serves the national interest, consideration is to be given to the
"Id. § 1504(c)(2).
Id. § 1504(g).
Id. § 1504(i)(1).
17 Id. § 1501(a)(3).
, Meltz, supra note 10, at 50046.
33 U.S.C. § 1504(i)(1)-(2) (Supp. IV, 1974).
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degree to which the proposed deepwater ports affect the environment, any
significant differences between anticipated completion dates for the pro-
posed installations and any differences in construction and operation costs
which may ultimately have a significant effect on the cost of oil to the
consumer. If no applicant satisfies these criteria, priority in obtaining a
license falls then to the adjacent coastal state, any political subdivision
thereof, or any state agency or instrumentality. States, like corporations,
may combine their programs and act in cooperation with each other.50
Priority is given next to persons neither engaged in producing, refining, or
marketing oil nor affiliated with any person involved in such activity.
Lowest priority is given to any other person, the oil industry included.
Senator James L. Buckley (NY) noted that such priority scheme discrimi-
nations in favor of a government applicant or a non-oil related applicant
do little to insure that the deepwater port will be constructed in a manner
which "clearly best serves the national interest." Rather, he urged that
each application for a given area be considered on its own merits, without
arbitrary or artificial constraints. 1
A further limitation on the Secretary's power over application approval
was imposed by Congress in order to protect the interests of states with
pending plans for construction of a deep draft channel and harbor located
adjacent to a proposed deepwater port. If an application is submitted for
a license to construct a deepwater port off the coast of such a state the
Secretary is prevented from issuing the license pending the results of a
comparison of the deep draft channel plan with the deepwater port appli-
cation. Relevant factors in this comparison are the economic, social, and
environmental impacts of each plan. The project best serving the national
interest shall then receive approval; this provision, however, does not pre-
clude a determination that both developments are warranted and thus
subject to approval.-"
Issuance of the license may be subject to any conditions which are
deemed necessary to give effect to the provisions of the Act.53 This includes
the authority of the Secretary to establish bonding requirements in order
to ensure that removal of all components of the deepwater port will be
accomplished in the event of revocation or termination of the license.54
Permits are to be issued for a maximum period of 20 years and are subject
to renewal for a period not to exceed 10 years, with preferential rights of
renewal given to the licensee.5 5 Licenses are subject to transferral if the
Secretary approves, pursuant to all relevant provisions of the Act.5" Opera-
Id. § 1508(d).
119741 U.S. CODE NEWS, supra note 3, at 7614.
: 33 U.S.C. § 1503(d) (Supp. IV, 1974).
Id. § 1503(e)(1).
Id. § 1503(e)(3).
' Id. § 1503(h).
Id. § 1503(b).
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tion of the port is subject to regulation as a common carrier in accordance
with the Interstate Commerce Act.57 This will presumptively result in yet
another opportunity for the government to supervise license operations.
One of the main concerns recognized by the Congress during considera-
tion of the Act and especially articulated by representatives of coastal
states was the assurance of effective input by affected states. 58 This con-
cern crystallized in efforts to include a state veto over proposed deepwater
port development offshore of interested states. The administration bill 9
represented quite another viewpoint from that displayed by the bill which
finally received the approval of Congress. The administration bill fell short
of actually empowering a state to halt deepwater port programs; the Act
as passed, however, provides that applications for such facilities be for-
warded to the governor of each adjacent coastal state for his approval. The
Secretary shall not issue a license without the approval of the governor of
each adjacent coastal state." State procedures for determining application
approval or disapproval are not dealt with by the Act, thus giving the
states discretion in this matter. "Adjacent coastal states" under the Act
are defined as states which border upon either the Atlantic, Pacific, or
Arctic Oceans or the Gulf of Mexico, and fall into one of three classes: (1)
a state directly connected to the deepwater port by pipeline; or, (2) a state
located within 15 miles of the proposed deepwater port; or, (3) any state
to which the risk of coastal environment damage is equal to or greater than
the risk posed to a state directly connected by pipeline to the proposed
deepwater port.'
States are favored in other areas as well, particularly in the first priority
given under § 1504(i)(2)(A) to states seeking a permit to operate their own
deepwater port. The Act further attempted to insure that interested states
would not be entirely left out of the decision making process, as evidenced
by § 1508(b)(2) providing that any interested state "shall have the oppor-
tunity to make its views known to, and shall be given full consideration
by, the Secretary regarding the location, construction, and operation of a
deepwater port," and § 1504(a) which seeks to insure that any regulation
issued by the Secretary regarding licensing procedures will provide for "full
consultation and cooperation" with any potentially affected coastal state.
This last provision is subject to an interpretation as expansive as the
Secretary desires to make. Certainly the argument can be made that the
operation of a deepwater port situated off the coast of Georgia will have
possible environmental implications for other areas of the East coast as
well. Any oil resulting from a discharge might find its way into the Gulf
!d. § 1507.
• See generally, Equal Voice Hearings, supra note 8.
' Introduced as S. 1751, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (April 18, 1974).
33 U.S.C. § 1508(b)(1) (Supp. IV, 1974).
Id. § 1508(a)(1)-(2).
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Stream, conceivably having far-reaching effects. However, as a counter
balance to such possibilities the committees expressed the desire for confir-
mation by the National Atmospheric and Oceanic Administration that a
state is an adjacent coastal state within the meaning of the Act based upon
a determination that a substantial risk would confront the state. The cri-
teria for determining the risk would be a comparison of the volume of spills
now occurring from offshore lightering and other methods of oil transfer
with the potential risk from the proposed deepwater port."2 It would ap-
pear, however, that neither quantum would be readily assessable for an
area presently not engaged in the transshipment of oil. Both figures would
of necessity be applied by analogy from other areas: the risk accompany-
ing the deepwater port from a previously operational deepwater port in
some other geographical locale, and the amount of oil loss now resulting
from off-shore lightering from yet another location. Such artificial contriv-
ances would do little to provide an accurate estimate of the environmental
effects which could be anticipated.
The remedy sections of the Act include a large arsenal of enforcement
techniques. Responsibility in this area is vested in the Secretary but the
Act also contemplates civilian participation by its broad citizen suit provi-
sions. Under § 1514, willful violators of any provision of the Act, or any
rule, order or regulation issued pursuant thereto, are subject upon convic-
tion to a maximum fine of $25,000 for each day of violation, each violation
being regarded as a separate offense. 3 In addition, available relief includes
equitable relief and in rem liability of vessels used in violation of the Act
for any civil or criminal fine imposed as a result."4 This provision is re-
stricted to those cases in which the owners or charterers were consenting
parties to the violation or privy to such violation. The statute provides
jurisdiction and venue in the district courts, with jurisdiction in any dis-
trict where the defendant resides or is doing business. The Attorney Gen-
eral may file an action for license revocation or suspension or equitable
relief to redress a violation in the district court nearest to the deepwater
port. 5
Citizen suit provisions" establish the right of citizen participation in the
enforcement of control requirements and regulations created under the
Act. Section 1515 authorizes citizens to bring civil actions for equitable
relief against any person in violation of the Act, including a government
agency, and against the Secretary in case of an alleged failure to perform
a nondiscretionary act. This relieves the plaintiff of the necessity of relying
on agency actions as a basis upon which to bring suit, claiming agency
' 119741 U.S. CODE NEWS, supra note 3, at 7540.
33 U.S.C. § 1517(a)(2) (Supp. IV, 1974).
"Id. § 1514(d).
'5 Id. §§ 1511(a), 1514(c).
" Id. § 1515.
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abuse of authority or violation of explicit statutory authority. The district
courts are given jurisdiction over citizen suits regardless of the amount in
controversy or the citizenship of the parties. Final awards to citizen plain-
tiffs may include the costs of litigation (including reasonable attorney fees
and expert witness fees) whenever such awards are appropriate. The right
to maintain a citizen suit is restricted to situations in which the Secretary
or Attorney General is not diligently prosecuting such a suit (although
intervention as a matter of right in such cases is allowed). Also, no action
is maintainable prior to 60 days after the plaintiff has given notice of the
suit to the Secretary and the alleged violator. Problems often encountered
in litigation of this sort involving lack of information necessary to maintain
the suit are remedied by § 1513 providing for public access to a wide variety
of documents and communications.
The class action provisions67 of the Act, granting a means of relief to all
those suffering damage resulting from an oil spill, are particularly notewor-
thy. In case of such injury the Attorney General is granted the authority
to act for any such class of injured plaintiffs; if within 90 days he has not
done so, a class action may then be maintained by any member of the
group. A major obstruction to maintainance of a class action of this sort
was erected by the Supreme Court in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin8 in
which it was held that a class action employing only publication notice to
its members could not stand in light of Rule 23(a)(2) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure requiring "individual notice." Few public interest
groups have the funds to personally notify each party plaintiff. In order to
insure a meaningful class action provision, § 1517(i)(2) allows notice by
publication in local newspapers serving the areas in which the damaged
parties reside.
The provisions of the Act barring a citizen suit if the appropriate agency
is diligently pursuing the action and requiring 60 days notice prior to the
filing of suit clearly indicate that citizen action should only be undertaken
pursuant to the primary enforcement responsibility vested in the Secre-
tary. But the citizen suit provisions are not stringent as regards the con-
cerned citizen plaintiff and do compare favorably with such provisions
found in the Clean Air Act and Water Pollution Control Act Amend-
ments." In fact, excluding the class action notice provisions, the section
was probably modeled after the citizen suit provisions in those acts.70 The
comprehensive nature of the remedies and liabilities section of the Act
underscores the concern the Congress felt towards the environmental is-
sues involved. Such provisions, coupled with their rigid enforcement, rep-
resents the environmentalists' best hope of realizing the goal of a clean
" Id. § 1517(i).
" 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
1 See generally, Ipsen and Raisch, Enforcement under the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act of 1972, 9 LAND & WATER L. REV. 369 (1974).
7" Id. at 413.
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environment. The Deepwater Port Act, with its provisions for full disclo-
sure provides only a starting point for this effort; however, it is a starting
point of substantial girth.
IV. JURISDICTIONAL BASIS
The proponents of the Deepwater Port Act expressly recognized the
problems presented by the establishment of fixed structures on the high
seas purportedly included within the jurisdictional ambit of the United
States Government.7 Although it was at no time suggested that the United
States was attempting to extend its exclusive sovereign jurisdiction over
any area of the high seas, the practical effects of the Act dictate the formu-
lation of a clearly defined federal posture concerning the status of deepwa-
ter port installations vis-A-vis the law of the United States.
Once such a deepwater port is constructed, be it a monobuoy or a fixed
installation, the immediate effect will be the subjection of a portion of the
high seas to exclusive United States control. Not only does the physical
presence of the structure itself deny the use of that portion of the sea to
another user, but the Act further provides that the licensee shall not per-
mit a vessel flying the flag of a foreign state to call at or utilize the deepwa-
ter port unless, ". . . the foreign state involved, by specific agreement with
the United States, has agreed to recognize the jurisdiction of the United
States over the vessel and its personnel . . . while the vessel is located
within the safety zone. ... 1 A second requirement compels the foreign
state to appoint an agent for service of process within the United States.13
The result of these requirements is the subjection of foreign vessels to the
jurisdiction of the United States district courts in the event of an accident
or violation of the Act's provisions, even though the ship may have ap-
proached no closer than 20 miles or more of the territorial sea.
The fact that such strange possibilities exist is a manifestation of the
flux which the concept of freedom of the high seas finds itself in at the
present time. The constant rate of scientific progress experienced in this
century has opened to man's view the exciting possibilities of exploiting
the ocean floor itself. This rapid rate of scientific advancement has re-
sulted, some believe, in a lacuna in the law.74 The possibility of erecting
structures on the high seas miles beyond any land or territorial limits has
1' [19741 U.S. CODE NEWS, supra note 3, at 7535-36; 33 U.S.C. § 1521 (Supp. IV, 1974)
authorizing and requesting the President to enter into negotiations with Canada and Mexico
in order to determine the need for intergovernmental understandings regarding deepwater
port activity and to eliminate any legal and regulatory uncertainty, in order to assure that
the interests of the people of Canada, Mexico, and the United States are adequately met.
72 Id. § 1518(c)(1).
71 Id. § 1518(c)(2).
7 Panhuys and Boas, Legal Aspects of Pirate Broadcasting, 60 AM. J. INT'L L. 303, 332
(1966) [hereinafter cited as Panhuys and Boas]; contra, 4 J. VERZIJL, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 96 (1971).
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only achieved viability in recent years. International law has recognized
the advent of this new technology, but in a piecemeal manner.7' This has
led, in situations confronting a state with a problem of first impression, to
a response involving unilateral action in order to provide an immediate
resolution of the difficulty.7" Deepwater ports present that type of situa-
tion. There is no rule of customary international law, nor any provision of
an international convention dealing specifically with the concept of a deep-
water port. The development of man's technical expertise has outpaced
that of his social structures; the task then, is to discover an acceptable
principle of international law which will embrace the deepwater port con-
cept by analogy.
As stated above, the concept of freedom of the seas is in a state of flux.
The speed with which this conceptual evolution is proceeding varies some-
what depending upon which part of the sea is under discussion. Recent
developments have indicated a movement towards allowing states to exer-
cise greater control than previously allowed over both the contiguous zone
and the continental shelf.77 Future developments of the law of the sea will
likely deal mainly with uses connected with the continental shelf and its
superadjacent waters."5 Thus, the development of deepwater port capabili-
ties can hardly be seen to present an issue which frustrates valid law of
the sea objectives. Furthermore, in this context it may be contended that
any principles of law dealing with such artificial installations and formu-
lated prior to an international consensus on the subject could be used as a
positive foundation upon which to base a customary rule of international
law, or at the least, provide a starting point for discussion. Whether or not
the resulting theory is regarded as "bootstrapping" will depend largely
upon its relation to precepts of codified international law.79
Convention on the Continental Shelf, April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578,
499 U.N.T.S. 311 (effective for United States June 10, 1964). In article 2, this Convention
recognizes permissible uses involving the continental shelf for purposes related to exploitation
only. Article 9 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone recognizes the
legality of the use of roadsteads while limiting such expansion to only that concept. Conven-
tion on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No.
5639, 1516 U.N.T.S. 205 (effective for United States Sept. 10, 1964), art. 9.
71 E.g., in the situations presented by offshore pirate broadcasting, Panhuys and Boas,
supra note 74; and also the establishment by the United States in the Atlantic Ocean of
"Texas Tower" radar installations up to 100 miles off the coast. Dorshaw, The International
Legal Implications of Off-Shore Terminal Facilities, 9 TEX. INT'L L. J. 205, 209-10 (1974)
1 hereinafter cited as Dorshaw].
E.g., recent developments of the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
concerning such concepts as the "Economic Zone."
71 See generally, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 1-76 (1975), concerned mainly with the Third Law of
the Sea Conference; STATE DEPT. INFORMAL SINGLE NEGOTIATING TEXT, Office of Law of the
Sea Negotiations, A/Conf. 62/WP.8/pt.II (May 9, 1975) [hereinafter cited as INFORMAL SINGLE
NEGOTIATING TEXT].
" Lawrence, Superports, Airports, and Other Fixed Installations on the High Seas, 6 J.
MARITIME L. AND COMMERCE 575, 588 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Lawrence].
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Two additional factors should be kept in mind. First, past understand-
ings concerning freedom of the seas tended to deal more with those activi-
ties which could not be carried on in international waters. It thus presented
a negative view concerned mostly with prohibited uses. Present trends,
however, seem to emphasize permitted uses." This is a positivist oriented
view dealing with an ever expanding panopoly of activities which nations
are recognizing as advantageous, a development probably in direct
response to technological advancements. Also, United States policy in the
area of the law of the sea has been directed towards claiming a narrow
territorial sea while seeking to extend jurisdiction to continguous zones for
special purposes, including enforcement of customs and other laws and
objectives of national security." This view envisions a case-by-case analy-
sis to determine whether or not the extension of jurisdiction in any given
case would be deemed to be within the national interest. The distinction
between assertion of jurisdiction and a claim to territory bears importantly
upon this point.
Traditional concepts of freedom of the seas hold that the high seas
constitute a region free to all and that no nation may validly subject any
portion of it to exclusive jurisdiction." This general concept has resulted
in two prevailing views of what this principle entails; one view holds that
the high seas are a thing that belongs to everyone (res communes).13 Be-
cause the high seas are a common resource subject to exclusive control by
no nation it follows that no nation may utilize any portion of the high seas
for other than permitted uses. These uses would presumably include all
uses permitted by tradition (shipping, hot pursuit, and uses recognized by
treaty, such as continental shelf exploitation, laying of pipelines, establish-
ment of navigational aids, etc.) Res communes is a concept embodying a
negative approach to the problem, an approach which is less attuned to
contemporary notions of what freedom of the seas should entail as a practi-
cal matter. The opposing view contends that the high seas belong to no one
in particular (res nullius);1 thus, all uses are permitted which do not
conflict with the rights of any other user. This view then, is essentially the
positivist answer to the first.
J. Colombos, in The International Law of the Sea suggests as the inevita-
ble compromise of the alternative lines of reasoning that the high seas are
common and open to all nations. 5 If this view is taken to mean that all
uses are permitted on the high seas by any nation some standard of deline-
ation must be devised in order to limit the principle in some rational
Id. at 582.
' Dorshaw, supra note 76, at 213.
J. COLOMBOS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 64 (6th ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as
COLOMBOSi.
11 Id. at 66.
' Id.
. Id.
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manner. This necessity arises as a response to the overly broad ramifica-
tions presented by such a comprehensive view. Clearly, all uses cannot be
permitted, for exercise of exclusive sovereignty would then be a permitted
use. If this were so, freedom of the seas as both a concept and a practical
matter would cease to exist-a victim of its own definition.86 Thus, the
doctrine of reasonableness (". . . in the absence of any international rules
that are agreed, the obligation of any state when using the high seas is to
use it with reasonable regard to other people's rights to use the high
seas.")8 7 finds its justification. It is a standard by which the validity of uses
permitted by Columbo's theory may be judged. Res nullius as a concept
permits all uses of the sea which do not conflict with the uses by other
nations. If a use does not conflict with another use, such non-conflicting
use must be reasonable. Thus Columbo's theory is, as a practical matter,
more in line with the res nullius concept of what freedom of the seas
entails. The result of this line of inquiry leads to a conclusion that should
the doctrine of res communes be adopted, the construction and operation
of deepwater ports on the high seas would be an invalid exercise of sover-
eignty, as international law has yet to deal with the issue. On the other
hand, res nullius would permit the construction and operation of such
ports provided that such activity constituted a reasonable use of the sea
and did not conflict with the rights of other nations. This latter view
comports substantially with the doctrine of reasonableness which was used
as the primary justification for the power of the United States government
to regulate and permit operation of deepwater ports on the high seas. 8
This theory of "reasonable use" finds its justification not only in such
abstract principles as res nullius but also in interpretation of Article 2 of
the Convention on the High Seas" which reads as follows:
The high seas being open to all nations, no State may validly purport
to subject any part of them to its sovereignty. Freedom of the high seas is
exercised under the conditions laid down by these articles and by the other
rules of international law. It comprises, inter alia, both for coastal and
non-coastal States:
(1) Freedom of navigation;
(2) Freedom of fishing;
(3) Freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines;
(4) Freedom to fly over.the high seas.
These freedoms, and others which are recognized by the general principles
of international law, shall be exercised by all States with reasonable re-
gard to the interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the
high seas.
" Lawrence, supra note 79, at 583.
'7 Env., supra note 4, at 139.
119741 U.S. CODE NEWS, supra note 3, at 7535-36.
April 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 (effective for United
States Sept. 30, 1962).
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As interpreted" this section indicates that its authors foresaw the need to
permit a broader range of uses than those four specifically listed. This
analysis can comfortably coexist with the counter-argument that although
the construction of a deepwater port may be seen as reasonable, the exten-
sion of federal jurisdiction and control over such areas does not clearly fall
within the purview of what is reasonable. The answer to this proposition
is that if it is reasonable to place such a structure on the high seas, it is
reasonable to provide for its protection." Failure to allow for such protec-
tion would violate generally accepted principles of property law.
Although the deepwater ports issue provides a new application of reason-
ableness, the theory has gained acceptance in other areas of international
law. Probably the most famous application of the doctrine occurred in the
Trail Smelter Case." The case arose as a result of damage suffered in the
state of Washington caused by sulfur dioxide fumes produced by the Trail
Smelter located across the border in Canada. The decision, holding that
Trail Smelter should be held liable for the damage it caused, recognizes
the principle that a sovereign state has no carte blanche to use its territory
in such an unreasonable manner as to cause injury without its borders. The
tribunal stated that,
I ..under the principles of international law, as well as the law of the
United States, no state has the right to use or permit the use of its territory
in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of
another or the properties of persons therein, when the case is of serious
consequences and the injury is established by clear and convincing evi-
dence.' 3
A state then must assume responsibility for its actions and those actions
should be reasonable. Applied to the deepwater port issue, if the United
States has indicated an acceptance of the responsibility for actions in this
area by the passage of the Deepwater Port Act, then it may operate such
ports in a reasonable manner subject to the right of a foreign state to object
to such use. The reasonableness approach finds further support in the
Legal Vacuum Theory. 4 The crux of this doctrine concerns occurrences not
covered by international law. It recognizes that the absence of territorial
sovereignty over the high seas does not mean that international law should
tolerate a vacuum of legal authority. Thus, as modern technology has
created the need for and the ability to construct a deepwater port, in the
absence of any generally recognized principles of law governing such activi-
,1 [19741 U.S. CODE NEWS, supra note 3, at 7535-36; Lawrence, supra note 79, at 582-84;
SOONs, ARTIFICIAL ISLANDS AND INSTALLATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 8 (1974) [hereinafter cited
as SooNsI; Merchant Marine Hearings, supra note 6, at 72-73.
" Id. at 74, 84; SOONS, supra note 90, at 21.
9 Trail Smelter Arbitral Decision (United States v. Canada), 111 U.N. REP. INT'L ARB.
AWARDS 1905 (1949), reprinted in 35 AM. J. INT'L L. 684 (1941).
13 Id. at 716.
"1 Panhuys and Boas, supra note 74, at 332-33.
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ties, a state engaged in such activity is free to extend its jurisdiction to
such installations in order to prevent a vacuum of law and to prevent the
inevitable damage from uncontrolled acts resulting from the complete ab-
sence of authority. This principle addresses itself to the fact that it is
reasonable to regulate human activity if lack of regulation would result in
anarchy. However, this would seem to be an attenuated line of reasoning,
and in light of existing criticisms of the "Vacuum Theory," '95 it may be
disregarded as a justification in itself. Its value is that it suggests that
states should not be compelled to await the lengthy processes inherent in
the formulation of international law when confronted by a problem which
demands speedy resolution.
The reasonableness approach satisfies both trends previously recognized
in this section, namely (1) the trend towards denoting positive uses (what
may be done rather than what may not be done) and (2) the interest of
the United States in maintaining a flexible definition of those activities
permitted on the high seas in order to prevent dramatic expansion of that
concept. 6 This last consideration represents a very real fear that broad
assertions of jurisdiction over the high seas might lead to the demise of a
free ocean should the trend gain international acceptance. Therein lies the
objection to analogizing from article two of the Convention of the Conti-
nental Shelf (hereinafter referred to as the Convention). 7 The article in
section 1 provides, "[t]he coastal State exercises over the continental
shelf sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its
natural resources." It was recognized that although this section might
provide a legal basis by analogy for asserting jurisdictional control over
structures connected to the continental shelf, it would be unwise to do so.
Deepwater ports clearly are not devices for exploiting the continental shelf
and to make such an analogy would open the door to similar extravagant
claims by other nations until freedom of the seas over the continental shelf
would cease to exist.
It is clear from the legislative history of the Act that Congress considered
the reasonableness doctrine to be in itself sufficient grounds upon which
to base extension of federal authority over deepwater ports located in inter-
national waters. Yet there are other bases upon which such jurisdiction
might have been predicated. The "Protective Theory" is another viable
justification for the extension of federal jurisdiction over the high seas
largely ignored in legislative considerations. The theory recognizes that
states have the obligation to protect both their citizens and their sovereign
territories, and to accomplish this, states occasionally must deal with
threats located outside their borders. The most dramatic recent example
of this was Dutch action regarding "pirate" broadcasting stations located
w, Id.
" Merchant Marine Hearings, supra note 6, at 70.
'7 See note 75 supra.
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beyond Dutch sovereignty transmitting to points within the country. In
justification of their actions taken against the pirate broadcasters the gov-
ernment contended that under international law a state might validly
exercise jurisdiction on the high seas in order to protect certain legal inter-
ests." Another example is presented by the Arctic Waters Pollution Pre-
vention Act99 enacted by Canada. This act sets up rules concerning oil
pollution in a designated prevention zone which extends beyond Canadian
territorial seas. In response to United States criticism of such actions the
Canadian government replied that the act was "a lawful extension of a
limited form of jurisdiction to meet particular dangers. .. .
This principle also provided the basis for United States actions during
prohibition against smugglers operating just beyond the three mile limit.
The case of The Grace and Ruby'0' concerned a schooner carrying liquor
intended for smuggling into the United States. The "Grace and Ruby"
anchored ten miles off the coast and sent ashore small boats to land its
contraband spirits. The smuggling attempt was thwarted however, and
two days later a Coast Guard cutter found the Grace and Ruby, then
situated some four miles from land, and seized her. In its determination
that the act of smuggling began outside the three mile limit and continued
to shore, the Massachusetts District Court examined the legality of the
vessel's seizure on the high seas and found:
The high seas are territory of no nation; no nation can extend its laws
over them; they are free to the vessels of all countries. But this has been
thought not to mean that a nation is powerless against vessels offending
against its laws which remain just outside the three mile limit.' 2
The court then went on to quote Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in the
1804 case of Church v. Hubbart.0 3
• ..its [a nation's] power to secure itself from injury may certainly
be exercised beyond the limits of its territory. . . .These means do not
appear to be limited within any certain marked boundaries which remain
the same at all times and in all situations. If they are such as unnecessarily
to vex and harass foreign lawful commerce, foreign nations will resist their
exercise. If they are such as are reasonable and necessary to secure their
laws from violation, they will be submitted to.' °'
" Panhuys and Boas, supra note 74, at 333; see also, North Sea Installations Act, Staats-
blad 1964, no. 447 (Neth.) reprinted in Panhuys and Boas, supra at 340-41, whose introduc-
tion reads in part, "Whereas we have deemed it desirable to make provision for protection of
legal interests .. ."
CAN. REV. STAT. c.2 (1st Supp. 1970) reprinted in 9 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 543 (1970).
Marin, The Quiet Revolution: Canadian Approaches to the Law of the Sea, in THE
CHANGING LAW OF THE SEA: WESTERN HEMISPHERE PERSPEcTIVEs 11, 29 (R. Zacklin ed. 1974)
[hereinafter cited as Marin].
-"- 283 F. 475 (D.C. Mass. 1922).
02 Id. at 477.
6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 187 (1804).
" Id. at 234.
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The Grace and Ruby court went on to note that although these views have
been questioned, Church v. Hubbart has never been expressly overruled.
That remains true today. 0 5
One objection to the "Protective Theory" is that it requires a unilateral
action. Although the Executive Department maintains the position that
such unilateral self-help is not a desirable precedent' it has seldom re-
fused to utilize the concept when such action was found to be in the
national interest. 07 Another point to be made is that the "Protective
Theory" requires as a prerequisite for its application the existence of an
external threat or risk which must be guarded against. In the absence of
any applicable treaties furnishing protection to the coastal environment
from the potential effects of a deepwater port it could be maintained that
the theory's application in this instance is desirable as a means of provid-
ing such protection.
The Convention on the Continental Shelf,"8 while approaching the juris-
dictional problem by extrapolation, fails to lead to the formulation of a
theory which would effectively justify the establishment of a safety zone
surrounding a deepwater port. The Act provides for the establishment of
such a zone for the purpose of navigational safety subject to recognized
principles of international law."0 9 Article three of the Convention, however,
states that, "[t]he rights of the coastal state over the continental shelf do
not affect the status of the superadjacent waters or high seas." It has been
suggested that such a qualification renders the Convention useless as a
basis of jurisdiction."10 This, of course, is in addition to the problems pre-
sented by the Convention's restrictive nature already mentioned."' The
creation of a safety zone is, however, capable of peaceful coexistence with
the "Reasonableness Theory." Such difficulties illustrate the need to anal-
ogize for solutions to such problems since existing international conven-
tions were not enacted with deepwater ports in mind.
Regardless of whether unilateral action in this area constitutes little
more than a bootstrap argument, such actions are in line with the recog-
nized trends of present international law. The Third United Nations Con-
ference on the Law of the Sea has placed the problem of artificial islands
on its agenda. The Second Committee will likely deal with artificial islands
and other structures not related to resource exploration by allowing coastal
control over such activities. The intention would be to provide a legal basis
for such installations while insuring their operation in a reasonable
" Prohibition's liquor-smuggling problems are discussed in Note, Foreign Liquor-Ships
Outside the Territorial Belt, 36 HARV. L. REV. 609 (1922-23).
"' Equal Voice Hearings, supra note 8, at 42-43.
17 Main, supra note 100, at 29.
'' See note 75 supra.
33 U.S.C. § 1509(d)(1) (Supp. IV, 1974).
Lawrence, supra note 79, at 580.
Dorshaw, supra note 76, at 214-15.
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manner."' The position of the United States as represented by its working
paper 3 would allow coastal states the exclusive right to regulate artificial
islands and other structures within its exclusive Economic Zone.
V. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPLICATIONS: OIL FEVER UNLEASHED
The construction of deepwater ports in the coastal waters of the United
States and the resulting use of these waters by supertankers of 200,000 dwt
or more pose tremendous environmental hazards. It has been estimated
that the damage caused by a major accident involving a supertanker off
the East coast could run into the billions of dollars."4 Twenty-four percent
of the 1971 total world production of shrimp was taken from the Gulf of
Mexico;"' consequently, a major accident in this area would involve awe-
some implications for its thriving seafood industry. As it is, the environ-
mental outlook for the oceans is presently none too bright. Marine pollu-
tion may have caused the death or destruction of 30 to 50 percent of oceanic
life in the last twenty years, laments oceanographer Jacques Costeau. Oth-
ers foresee the possible death of life in all oceans by the turn of the cen-
tury."6 Such predictions are steadily becoming more frequent.
In 1970, five million tons of oil found its way into the ocean, and oil either
deliberately or accidentally discharged from vessels represented 47 percent
of that total. There are presently 428 ships, including 100 tankers, resting
on the ocean floor off the east coast containing five million barrels of oil in
their tanks. Tankers deliberately pump one million tons of oil into the sea
each year." 7 Because such a great deal of oil pollution occurs on the high
seas, reasonableness would seem to indicate that the most expedient
method of containing this pollution would lie in efforts directed through
international channels. But such efforts have in reality had little or no
effect on the problem. There are at least two reasons for this. Because
ocean pollution has only recently received recognition as a problem, inter-
national law has not been able to maintain pace with technological ad-
vancements to the degree necessary to provide adequate legal protection
against the consequential environmental harm."" There also exists the
problem of perfecting and utilizing adequate supervisory capabilities in
order to monitor the activities of ships far out on the high seas.
There are currently a great many international conventions which pur-
"' Stevenson and Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Lau) of the Sea:
The 1974 Caracas Session, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 23 (1975).
. INFORMAL SINGLE NEGOTIATING TEXT, supra note 71, pt. II, 19-26.
" Meltz, supra note 10, at 50044.
Env., supra note 4, at 97.
"' Lanctot, Marine Pollution: A Critique of Present and Proposed International Agree-
ments and Institutions-A Suggested Global Oceans' Environmental Regime, 24 HASTINGS
L.J. 67, 69 (1972-73) [hereinafter cited as Lanctot].
"' Statistics gleaned from Joint Hearings, supra note 10, at 128-31; Kalsi, supra note 20,
at 79-81.
"' Lanctot, supra note 116, at 76.
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port to deal with the problem of pollution of the sea by oil." 9 Most of them
attempt to achieve effectiveness through flag and coastal state jurisdiction
over offending vessels depending upon the area of the sea in which the
violation occurs. The effectiveness of such techniques should be judged in
light of the prediction that present rates of oil discharge (the end result of
over 30 years of oil shipping activity) may well double in only five years. 120
The problem, then, has approached exponential rates of growth under
existing regimes of control. Effective action in this area will depend upon
such factors as adequate antipollution regulations concerning hull design,
manning requirements and permissible discharge rates, as well as agree-
ments on effective enforcement procedure.12 ' One solution to the problem
is the zonal approach1 2 whereby states would be given jurisdiction beyond
their territorial seas either in a specific pollution zone or an economic zone
within which states would maintain control over most, if not all, activities
connected with the "economic" uses of the area. This plan would supple-
ment the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag state outside areas of national
jurisdiction. The impediment presented by the lack of effective enforce-
ment capability on the high seas would thus be overcome.
Although the world order prefers a multilateral solution to the environ-
mental problems caused by oil pollution, at least one commentator has
advanced a thesis contending that that same world order would not con-
demn unilateral solutions having the necessary effects of extending coastal
state interference with navigation and trade on the high seas.'2 3 The Cana-
dian Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act is an example. The Deepwa-
ter Port Act may well be another. The latter's starting point for dealing
with the problem of the possibility of environmental damage is recognition
that the problem has a twofold nature, in that both the existence of the
deepwater port installation and its landbased supporting facilities pose
threats to the environment. This differentiation is absolutely necessary
because both operations involve a complex array of considerations meriting
individual attention.
The Act begins this process by including exhaustive definitions of both
the coastal environment 24 and the marine environment'25 in order to pro-
"' See the 1969 Brussels Convention on Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil
Pollution Casualties, in 9 INT'L LEGAL MAT'Ls 25 (1970); the 1969 Brussels Convention of Civil
Liabilities for Oil Pollution Damage, in 9 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 45 (1970); the 1972 London
Convention on the Dumping of Wastes at Sea, in 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 129 (1972); and the
1973 London Convention on the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, in 12 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS
1319 (1973). None of these agreements have been entered into by the United States.
122 Kalsi, supra note 20, at 80.
121 Lowe, The Enforcement of Marine Pollution Regulations, 12 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 624
(1974-75).
22 Id. at 627.
," Sweeny, Environmental Protection by Coastal States: The Paradigm from Marine
Transport of Petroleum, 4 GA. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 278, 281 (1974).
24 33 U.S.C. § 1502(6) (Supp. IV, 1974).
2 Id. § 1502(13).
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vide a basis for comprehensive coverage of all relevant components of each.
The Act provides for immediate compliance with environmental standards
at the time of licensing rather than at the commencement of construc-
tion.2 6 Applicants are required to demonstrate that the deepwater port will
be constructed and operated using the best available technology.'1 As a
"new source,"'' 8 deepwater ports will be subject to existing control strate-
gies to attain or to maintain the national standard. The Act specifically
provides' 9 for review of applications by the Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency in order to ensure that the proposed
deepwater port will conform with all applicable provisions of the Clean Air
Act,'1° the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, '3 and the Marine Protec-
tion, Research and Sanctuaries Act.'3 1 In addition, applications will be
reviewed according to criteria established by the Secretary in accordance
with the recommendations of the administrator of the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency and the administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmos-
pheric Administration and after consultation with any other federal agency
or department having jurisdiction over any aspect of the construction or
operation of the deepwater port.'3 3 Designated criteria cover both land and
sea-based operations. While states must at least comply with federal stan-
dards, they are not preempted from issuing and enforcing regulations even
more stringent than those provided.'3 4 Of course, the state's ultimate
weapon reposes in the form of its veto power. Because the Act includes its
own pollution liability mechanism'3 1 it may be regarded as a patch-work
measure, apparently in response to recognition that both state and federal
law have failed thus far to provide adequate compensation for oil pollution
damage. Such piecemeal measures exacerbate the inconsistencies of civil
liability coverage under United States law.'36
The ultimate environmental consequences to the ocean likely to be pro-
duced by deepwater ports can be roughly categorized as stemming from
two phases: construction and operation. Aspiring licensees presently have
three technological choices as to what type of facility to construct: (1) the
monobuoy, which is an offshore mooring anchored to the ocean floor. (The
' Id. § 1504(c)(1), (f), 1505.
Id. § 1503(c)(5).
Comments, Environmental Legislation Passed by the 93rd Congress: A Review, 5 ENv.
L. REP., 10021 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Comments, Environmental Legislation].
"1 33 U.S.C. § 1503(c)(6) (Supp. IV, 1974).
I' 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-58 (1970).
131 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp. IV, 1974).
16 U.S.C. §§ 1431-34 (Supp. IV, 1974).
33 U.S.C. § 1505 (Supp. IV, 1974).
13 Id. § 1517(k)(1); Comments, Environmental Legislation, supra note 128, at 10021.
33 U.S.C. § 1517 (Supp. IV, 1974).
Wood, Toward Compatible International and Domestic Regimes of Civil Liability for
Oil Pollution of Navigable Waters, 5 ENV. L. REP. 50116, 50120, 50145 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Wood!.
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tanker would be free to rotate around the buoy while discharging its cargo,
thus taking advantage of prevailing winds and currents. The monobuoy is
generally conceded to be the simplest and cheapest alternative, and is
favored by United States planners.); 3 ' (2) The sea island, which is fastened
by piles to the ocean floor and protected by a breakwater. (The tanker
would be tethered alongside at bow and stern.); (3) The artificial island,
which is constructed with fill and protected by a natural or man-made
breakwater. The primary advantage of the artificial island over a sea island
or monobuoy, would be its storage facilities. However, the artificial island
is the most expensive proposal. As the amount of environmental damage
to be expected varies directly with the amount of dredge and fill neces-
sary,' 38 the monobuoy would be the most desirable choice from an environ-
mental point of view. One disadvantage of the monobuoy is that in calm
seas the tanker tends to drift towards it, thus running the risk of fouling
the hoses and mooring lines. Proposed Coast Guard regulations to deal
with environmental problems related to construction would require the
submission of relevant soil data collected throughout the marine site and
along the pipeline path to shore in order to determine whether such soil is
capable of supporting the anticipated design load and to determine
whether forces associated with storm conditions will affect the sea bed. 39
Once construction is completed and the deepwater port becomes opera-
tional, the major dangers to the environment are weather conditions,
tanker accidents, discharges occurring from transfer operations, normal
effluent discharges such as sewage, failure of monitoring systems, and
ocean floor pipeline ruptures."' These threats are dealt with in two ways:
(1) Operation of the deepwater port will be subject to adherence to all
provisions of the Act and all conditions imposed by the Secretary. Such
conditions will take into account environmental criteria. Also, a right of
entry is granted"' to all United States officials in order to ensure compli-
ance. (2) A comprehensive civil liability plan' encompassing both dam-
ages and cleanup costs is provided for in addition to other civil and crimi-
nal penalties related to license suspension and revocation. The oil spill
liability provisions are patterned after the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act"3 and are especially strict."' Owners and operators of a vessel which
'3 Meltz, supra note 10, at 50044.
' Merchant Marine and Fisheries Hearings, supra note 6, at 138-39.
' Coast Guard Proposes Regulations to Protect Marine, Coastal Environment, 6 ENV.
REP.-CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 81 (1975).
"' Environmental Impact of Proposed Law to Vary with Location of Each Terminal, 5 ENV.
REP.-CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 142-43 (1974-75).
33 U.S.C. § 1512(b) (Supp. IV, 1974).
I42 d. § 1517.
' 33 U.S.C. § 1151-75 (1961).
'4' Meltz, supra note 10, at 50045.
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discharges oil into the safety zone around the facility are strictly liable for
cleanup costs and damages up to $150 per gross ton or $20 million, which-
ever is less, for each discharge. Should the discharge be found to result
from gross negligence or willful misconduct such liability is unlimited.'
Should the discharge occur while the tanker is moored at the deepwater
port the licensee is similarly held strictly liable to the maximum extent of
$50 million unless the discharge is found to be the result of gross negligence
or willful misconduct, in which case liability is unlimited.'46 Vessel and
port operators are required to report all such discharges.'47 Failure to do
so, however, incurs a fine of only $10,000 and/or one year imprisonment.
Intended for use in situations involving damages and cleanup costs in
excess of liability ceilings, the Act establishes a $100 million Deepwater
Port Liability Fund"' to be funded by a fee of two cents on each barrel of
oil passing through the port. Should cleanup costs and damages exceed the
amount of money in the fund, the fund may borrow the balance required
from the federal treasury. The fund is liable without fault for such charges.
Defenses available under the Act permit the vessel or licensee to avoid
liability by proving that an oil discharge was the result of an act of war or
negligence on the part of the federal government in establishing and main-
taining aids to navigation.' If one of these defenses is established, under
§ 18(h)(5) the vessel or licensee may recover all cleanup costs from the
fund. States are not preempted and may set even higher liabilities.' m
The establishment of the Deepwater Port Liability Fund (patterned
after the Trans-Alaska Liability Fund'"') and the provisions for damages
compensation constitute an attempt to internalize the present external
costs of oil pollution. There are several reasons why this might be desira-
ble.'" ' (1) The interests of justice are served when oil pollution victims,
especially innocent third parties, are fully compensated. (2) Full liability
for all pollution damage is necessary to deter unnecessarily dangerous or
negligent conduct and to encourage a socially optimal level of precautions
for the industry as a whole. (3) All costs of oil pollution should be internal-
ized so that the market system will favor the most economical among
several alternate sources of energy and methods of oil transportation. (4)
A system of liability insurance coverage for unavoidable oil spills could
readily be made the responsibility of the oil and shipping interests while
oil pollution victims could not readily purchase such coverage. This is
explained in part by the random nature of such damage. The Act further
33 U.S.C. § 1517(d) (Supp. IV, 1974).
,, Id. § 1517(e).
, Id. § 1517(b).
" Id. § 1517(f).
" Id. § 1517(h)(5).
Id. § 1517(k)(1).
Comments, Environmental Legislation, supra note 128, at 10021.
'5 Wood, supra note 136, at 50126.
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attempts to internalize such social costs by allowing adjacent states the
right to set fees in compensation for the environmental and administrative
costs attributable to the construction and operation of deepwater ports,
including land based facilities.15 3
Establishment of a deepwater port in an area will entail substantial
landside effects. Pipelines from the port to either refineries or major distri-
bution pipelines will disturb the coastal environment, with marshlands
and estuary currents likely to suffer the brunt of this activity. But aside
from such results, the major effects will relate to the petrochemical indus-
tries likely to become established in nearby areas as well as the support
systems, such as tank farms, which will service the ports. Natural laws of
economics will tend to increase crude oil throughput once the terminal
facility has been constructed. As crude processing and its directly asso-
ciated industries increase, the need for service industries would increase,
as would the economic justification for locating them in proximity to the
petroleum processes. Economics favor petrochemical complexes which are
in close proximity to refineries engaged in the production of a full range of
products." 4 This translates into massive investments. For instance, the
total cost of the Seadock proposal (off Freeport, Texas) is estimated at $545
million. Three hundred and ten million dollars are earmarked for construc-
tion of the monobuoy and pipeline to shore. The land-based terminal will
cost $80 million and the distribution system to the refineries will cost $155
million; $235 million will thus be spent on land-based development. The
LOOP (Louisiana Offshore Oil Port) proposal is estimated to cost $460
million. Of that total, 67 percent will be used for onshore construction,
with an additional $88 million required to connect the facility with an
existing pipeline distribution system. 55 An expenditure of such magnitude
will have far reaching effects. The drain on the coastal resources will be
tremendous. Estimates of resources which will be required by the LOOP
proposal include 36,869 acres of land for refinery-related activities, an
additional drain of 29.5 million gallons of fresh water daily, and daily
discharges of 1.3 million pounds of industrial effluents and 27.5 million
pounds of particulate matter. 56 Such industrial-related growth would re-
quire new housing, increased transportation services, more schools,
increased electrical demand and increased demand on existing recreational
facilities. 51 In other words, superport development translates into an ever-
expanding spectrum of related development, all of which will further tax
the region's ecosystem. Sparsely developed regions may desire such
153 33 U.S.C. § 1504(h)(2) (Supp. IV, 1974).
"I 1 ARTHUR D. LITrLE, INC., POTENTIAL ON SHORE EFFECTS OF DEEPWATER OIL TERMINAL-
RELATED INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT 8 (Executive Summary 1974).
' Merchant Marine and Fisheries Hearings, supra note 6, at 45-46.
'a Joint Hearings, supra note 10, at 552.
'. Train Testifies in Favor of Bill Authorizing Offshore Deep Water Ports, 4 ENV.
REP.-CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 274 (1973).
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activity. Many well-developed regions will not. " Nondegradation issues
may be raised. 159
In any event, the Act's provisions for dealing with such possibilities are
astoundingly brief given the magnitude of the problem. Aside from requir-
ing the Secretary to judge license applications on the basis of certain
aforementioned environmental standards, the main thrust of the Act in
this area is set out in § 1508(c). The Secretary is prohibited from issuing a
license unless the adjacent coastal state to which the deepwater port is to
be connected by pipeline has developed, or is making reasonable progress
toward developing, an approved management program pursuant to the
Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972180 for the area to be directly and
primarily impacted by land and water development in the coastal zone
resulting from such deepwater port. By thus tying the Deepwater Port Act
into an existing land use program it was hoped that landside development
might proceed in a socially optimal manner. The wisdom of that choice is
still to be proven.
Basically, the primary thrust of the Coastal Zone Management Act is
to establish a federal granting program to assist states in developing and
operating land management programs for their coastal land and water
resources.'"' The legislation does not require state participation but the
incentives to such action are the desire for federal funds and possibly the
desire to develop a deepwater port. If the state desires to participate, the
federal government will give them a planning grant, used to formulate a
management program over coastal development. Once a program is ap-
proved by the Secretary of Commerce the state becomes eligible for con-
tinuing federal assistance grants of up to 66.6 percent of the program's cost.
In order to obtain federal approval the state management program must
contain certain substantive elements such as: (1) definition of what shall
constitute permissible land and water uses within the coastal zone which
have a direct and significant impact on coastal waters, (2) an inventory
and designation of areas of particular concern (which might include areas
such as marshlands or an area especially suited for development as a
deepwater port), and (3) identification of the means by which the state
proposes to exert control over land and water uses (which is probably the
real thrust of the act).
The Coastal Zone Management Act is an integral part of the legal and
institutional framework which will govern development on the outer conti-
nental shelf.'62 The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)'s3 is an
indispensible adjunct to the Act in that it provides a mechanism by which
' Witness the virtual abandonment of the deepwater port project in Delaware.
,s' Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C. 1972).
'' 16 U.S.C. § 1451-64 (1972).
"' FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 831 (E. Dolgin and T. Guilbent eds. 1974).
Is2 [d. at 832.
' 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331-35, 4341-47 (1968).
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to balance the benefits of resource development against the costs in-
volved.'"1 For the NEPA process to be effective in performing this analysis
for outer continental shelf development the costs considered must include
not only possible or expected environmental harms, but also probable
social and economic impacts on the coastal zone, such as increased popula-
tion, cultural disruption, loss of aesthetic amenities and the need for ex-
panded public services. 6 5 If this process is used, onshore deepwater port-
related development will certainly provide adequate means with which to
effect it.
Two considerations should be noted. First section 306(c)(8) of the
Coastal Zone Management Act provides that in approving a state coastal
zone management program the Secretary of Commerce must determine
that "the management program provides for adequate consideration of the
national interest involved in the siting of facilities necessary to meet re-
quirements which are other than local in nature." What does this less than
slightly cryptic remark forbode? A representative of the Department of
Commerce stated the following:
Thus, we believe that the provisions of the proposed deep water facili-
ties bill and those of the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 reflect the
same intent. That is, deep water port facilities and their attendant on-
shore development should be consistent with state planning and pro-
grams. Conversely, State plans to receive Federal approval should make
provision for facilities which are required in the broader national interest.
We believe that these objectives can be met through careful planning and
program coordination. 66
Of course, the states retain a veto over such facilities if undesired. But such
statements provide adumbration of federal coercion. Secondly, the idea of
controlling land-based development through state management programs
will only be as effective as the officials who implement it. The siting of
facilities is a highly complex process involving developers, interest groups
and numerous authorities at all levels of government. Measured in terms
of environmental quality indicators the process is largely ineffective in
insuring appropriate siting and design decisions.'67 Development-oriented
coastal zone management programs will ensure the continuation of such
trends and afford small protection to those most affected.
"I Comments, The Rush for Offshore Oil and Gas: Where Things Stand on the Outer
Continental Shelf, 5 ENV. L. REP. 10026, 10028 (1975).
Id.
,' Honorable Howard W. Pollock, Deputy Administrator, National Oceanic and Atmos-
pheric Administration, Merchant Marine and Fisheries Hearings, supra note 6, at 200.
"I Baram, Environmental Decision-Making and the Siting of Facilities, 5 ENV. L. REP.
50089 (1975).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Deepwater Port Act is primarily a response to the contemporary
economics of oil transshipment; yet it also recognizes that United States
extension of jurisdiction over areas of the high seas must be contained
within a comprehensive definition of the purposes and limits of such ac-
tion. The Act is also a response to environmental problems inherent in
activities of this sort.
The Act foresees deepwater port development in conjunction with per-
mits issued by the Secretary of Transportation. Because operation of deep-
water ports depends on federal approval of permit applications and con-
tinuing compliance with federal regulations, licensees are expected to con-
duct their operations in compliance with federal standards. Input from
other sources is provided by liberal provisions regarding state authority
over deepwater port development and viable citizen suit provisions.
Currently recognized tenets of the "Law of the Sea" do not specifically
provide mechanisms for justifying deepwater port development beyond
existing territorial boundaries. The United States chooses to justify deep-
water port activity on the high seas through application of the "Doctrine
of Reasonable Use," a generally recognized principle in international law
derived from article 2 of the Convention on the Continental Shelf. Other
theories exist which could be applied to the problem; however, the "Rea-
sonable Use Doctrine" best serves United States interests in this regard in
as much as the application of the doctrine results in a concept of limited
extension of jurisdiction beyond coastal boundaries. United States action
in this regard is in line with current "Law of the Sea" trends.
Implications for the environment stemming from deepwater port devel-
opment consist of possible oil pollution and other environmental dangers
resulting from offshore operations as well as possible damages to coastal
ecosystems resulting from landside support activity development. Contin-
ual federal and state surveillance coupled with comprehensive civil liabil-
ity for oil pollution provisions are the cornerstones of efforts to ensure
against overwhelming damage resulting from actual tanker and port opera-
tions. Landside development is tied into guidelines provided by the states
in their plans formulated pursuant to the Coastal Zone Management Act
of 1972.
Overall, the Deepwater Port Act is an ambitious attempt to grapple with
a wide range of anticipated problems through a format which places heavy
emphasis on the value of pre-planning. In such a relatively novel area of
man's endeavor as that dealt with by the Act, little more can be done.
Faced with the need to implement some type of viable response to an
impending national energy crisis, the Congress has shown an admirable
desire to strike a balance between contemporary needs and the needs of
future generations. Whether the two can comfortably coexist will only be
determined once the actual machinery of the Act and of the deepwater
ports themselves becomes operational.
James Hamrick Gnann, Jr.
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